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1 Introduction
There has been increasing interest in intuitionistic methods over the years. Still,
there has been relatively little work on intuitionistic set theory, and most of
that has been on intuitionistic ZF. This investigation is about intuitionistic
admissibility and theories of similar strength.
There are several more particular goals for this paper. One is just to get some
more Kripke models of various set theories out there. Those papers that have
dealt with IZF usually were more proof-theoretic in nature, and did not provide
models. Furthermore, the inspirations for many of the constructions here are
classical forcing arguments. Although the correspondence between the forcing
and the Kripke constructions are not made tight, the relationship between these
two methods is of interest (see [6] for instance) and some examples, even if only
suggestive, should help us better understand the relationship between forcing
and Kripke constructions. Along different lines, the subject of least and greatest
fixed points of inductive definitions, while of interest to computer scientists, has
yet to be studied constructively, and probably holds some surprises. Admissi-
bility is of course the proper set-theoretic context for this study. Finally, while
most of the classical material referred to here has long been standard, some of
it has not been well codified and may even be unknown, so along the way we’ll
even fill in a gap in the classical literature.
∗I would like to thank Anil Nerode for bringing the subject of intuitionistic set theory to
my attention, Michael Rathjen for his encouragement in bringing this work to completion,
and the referee for the careful reading and insistence on including the details, even when I
didn’t think they were necessary.
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The next section develops the basics of IKP, including some remarks on
fixed points of inductive definitions. After that some classical theories related
to KP are presented, and the question of which imply which others is completely
characterized. While they are not equivalent in general, when restricted to initial
segments of (classical) L they are. However, the section after that shows that
in intuitionistic L this equivalence breaks down. We close with some questions.
2 IKP
The axioms of classical KP are: Empty Set, Pairing, Union, Extensionality,
Foundation (as a schema for all definable classes), ∆0 Comprehension (also
known as ∆0 Separation), and ∆0 Bounding (also known as ∆0 Collection).
Often Infinity is adjoined; we will also use the axiomatisation with Infinity in
this paper. There is not much trouble adapting these to an intuitionistic setting.
The concept of a ∆0 formula needs no change. As usual, Foundation must be
replaced by ∈-Induction: ∀x(∀y ∈ x φ(y) → φ(x)) → ∀x φ(x), where φ is a
formula in the language of set theory. Also, the standard version of Infinity, as
in [9] for instance (∃x [(∃y y ∈ x) ∧ (∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ x y ∈ z)]), won’t do, because
you need Power Set and Π1 Comprehension to get ω; instead, take the version
of Infinity from [7] (∃x [0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x ∃z ∈ x(z = y ∪ {y}) ∧ ∀y ∈ x(y =
0 ∨ ∃z ∈ x y = z∪{z})]), which axiomatizes ω straightforwardly. We take IKP
to be KP with these few adaptations.
This choice can be further justified. Two other axiomatizations of KP are
to replace ∆0 Bounding with either Σ Bounding or Σ Reflection. Taking the
Σ formulas to be the closure of the ∆0 formulas under ∧,∨, ∃, and bounded
quantification, these equivalences hold intuitionistically, for the same reasons
they do classically. Rather than repeating these completely standard arguments
here, the reader is referred to [1], theorems I.4.3 and I.4.4, the proofs of which go
through unchanged in IKP. In addition, under IKP every Σ formula is equivalent
to a Σ1 formula, proven inductively on formulas.
One could also consider many of the standard consequences of KP. The ones
of interest to us are:
1. Σ Replacement,
2. Strong Σ Replacement,
3. ∆ Comprehension,
4. Σ Recursion,
5. the Second Recursion Theorem, and
6. Σ Inductive Definitions.
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Σ Replacement and Strong Σ Replacement (∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y) → ∃f ∀x ∈
A f(x) 6= ∅ ∧ ∀y ∈ f(x) φ(x, y)) hold intuitionistically, by the same proofs
as in the classical case; again, the reader is referred to [1], theorems I.4.6 and
I.4.7. ∆ Comprehension requires considerably more care. Usually a ∆ property
is defined as being given by a pair φ, ψ of Σ and Π formulas respectively, but
when it’s used the first thing you do is deal with ¬ψ as a Σ formula. This won’t
work intuitionistically. The next obvious guess at what a ∆ property should
be is a pair φ, ψ of Σ formulas such that ∀x [(φ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ∧ ¬(φ(x) ∧ ψ(x))].
The problem here is that too much is being demanded: such a definition would
be almost impossible to meet. Consider a very simple property, such as “x
= ∅”. What would be a ∆ definition of this, according to the above notion
of ∆? If φ(x) is “x = ∅” and ψ(x) is “x 6= ∅” then we certainly do not have
∀x (φ(x)∨ψ(x)). To address these (and other) problems, we will be content with
defining ∆1, noting that Σ resp. Π formulas are under IKP provably equivalent
to Σ1 resp. Π1 formulas. A ∆1 property of a variable x is given by a pair of ∆0
formulas φ(x, y), ψ(x, y) with free variables x,y such that
∀x[∃y¬¬(φ(x, y) ∨ ψ(x, y)) ∧ ∀y¬(φ(x, y) ∧ ψ(x, y))].
With this notion of ∆1, ∆1 Comprehension is provable in IKP; see [1] theorem
I.4.5.
That a function defined by Σ recursion is Σ1 definable holds in both KP
and IKP; again, the proof from [1], theorem I.6.4 holds. The Second Recursion
Theorem, as stated and proved in [1] V.2, pretty much stands as is, except that
when syntax and semantics are introduced in ch. III all of the standard Boolean
connectives must be included as primitives (since, for instance, in our context
→ cannot be defined in terms of ¬ and ∨). The fact that the least fixed point
of a positive inductive Σ definition is Σ1 definable actually requires a bit of care
in one point, so the development of this theory will be summarized here, with
the reader referred to [1] for the details.
In IZF, suppose Γ : P(X)→ P(X) is a monotone inductive operator on X.
Consider {Y |Γ(Y ) ⊆ Y }. This set is non-empty, since it contains X itself as a
member. Let Γfix =
⋂
{Y |Γ(Y ) ⊆ Y }. By the monotonicity of Γ,Γ(Γfix) ⊆
Γfix. Applying Γ again we get ΓΓ(Γfix) ⊆ ΓΓfix, so Γ(Γfix) ∈ {Y |Γ(Y ) ⊆ Y },
and Γfix ⊆ Γ(Γfix). Hence Γfix = Γ(Γfix), and Γfix is a fixed point. Moreover,
by its definition, Γfix is the least fixed point. Γfix can also be defined from
the bottom up. Inductively on ordinals β, let Γ<β =
⋃
α<β Γα,Γβ = Γ(Γ<β).
(Note the standard way to induct on ordinals intuitionistically, which avoids the
successor-or-limit case split.) Let Γ∞ =
⋃
β∈ORD Γβ , which can be shown to be
a set using Bounding. (Note that Replacement will not do! Let ψ(Y, β) be “Y =
Γβ”; since such a β cannot be uniquely chosen, we need (Comprehension and)
Bounding in order to get a range for ψ, a set A of ordinals such that ∀Y ⊆ X
if ∃β Y = Γβ then ∃β ∈ A Y = Γβ . Letting γ = TC(A), Γ∞ = Γγ . This is
where the current argument differs from its classical version, and recurs when
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discussing admissible sets proper.) It’s easy to see that Γβ ⊆ Γfix, inductively
on β, and that Γ∞ is a fixed point, making Γ∞ equal to Γfix.
Now particularize to the case where Γ is given by an X-positive Σ formula
ψ: Γ(Y) = { x ∈ X | ψ(x, X) }. (What follows is adapted from [1], VI.2.6.) If
M is admissible (i.e. M |= IKP), then, letting α = ORD(M), Γ∞ = Γ<α, as
follows. InM, the relation “x ∈ Γβ” is a Σ1 relation, using the Second Recursion
Theorem. So φ(x,Γ<α) is a Σ relation, where “y ∈ Γ<α” is interpreted as “∃β
y ∈ Γβ”. If φ(x,Γ<α) holds, then, by Σ Bounding, there is a set of ordinals A ∈
M such that φ(x,
⋃
β∈A Γβ) holds. Letting γ = TC(A), φ(x,Γ<γ), and x ∈ Γγ .
So Γα = Γ<α is a fixed point. Since Γ<α ⊆ Γ∞ too, Γ<α = Γ∞. It has already
been observed that Γ<α is Σ1 definable over M.
So where are the differences between KP and IKP? Typically properties that
a classical set theorist identifies automatically become inequivalent in an intu-
itionistic setting. No one would believe that every property around admissibility
has the same status in IKP.
If one of the pleasures of intuitionism is to surprise our intuitions, then you’re
in for a treat. You would have expected to find some difference between KP and
IKP among the most common properties, those already cited. So there’s no use
having the differences there, where you’re already looking for them. Rather, the
differences show up where you’d never think to check, right under your nose.
Consider the basic axiom, ∆0 Bounding:
∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y)→ ∃B ∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ B φ(x, y), φ ∈ ∆0.
Consider the contrapositive with the negations pushed through (the “classical
contrapositive”, with φ absorbing the negation):
∀B ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B φ(x, y)→ ∃x ∈ A ∀y φ(x, y), φ ∈ ∆0.
We call this latter property ∆0 Uniformity. Of course classically ∆0 Uniformity
and ∆0 Bounding are equivalent as contrapositives, but intuitionistically they’re
not, as we’ll see later.
An alternative to ∆0 Bounding classically is Σ Reflection:
φ→ ∃A φ(A), φ ∈ Σ,
where the superscript means bound all as yet unbound quantifiers by the su-
perscript. The classical contrapositive is:
∀A φ(A) → φ, φ ∈ Π.
The latter property is called Π Persistence. Finally, regarding the last alterna-
tive axiomatization of KP, Σ Bounding, its classical contrapositive is Π Unifor-
mity.
Proposition 2.0.1 Over IKP - ∆0 Bounding, the following are equivalent:
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1. Π Persistence
2. Π Uniformity
3. ∆0 Uniformity.
proof: In what follows, we will rely heavily on the fact that, for φ a Π formula,
if B ⊆ A then φ(A) → φ(B). This is proved by induction on Π formulas. The
same also holds for A = V: if B is a set, then φ→ φ(B).
(1) → (2) Suppose that ∀B ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B φ(x, y), φ a Π formula. By
the above mentioned fact, ∀B ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B φ(x, y)(B), i.e. ∀B (∃x ∈
A ∀y φ(x, y))(B). By Π Persistence, ∃x ∈ A ∀y φ(x, y), as was to be shown.
(2) → (3) trivial
(3)→ (1) We show that Π Persistence holds for all Π formulas φ by induction
on φ.
The base case, φ ∆0, is trivial, since φ
(A) = φ.
Suppose φ = ψ0∨ψ1. Assume ∀A(ψ0∨ψ1)(A), which equals ∀A(ψ
(A)
0 ∨ψ
(A)
1 ).
We claim that ∀B ∃x ∈ {0, 1} ∀y ∈ B ((x = 0 ∧ ψ
(y)
0 ) ∨ (x = 1 ∧ ψ
(y)
1 )).
To see this, by assumption ∀A(ψ
(A)
0 ∨ ψ
(A)
1 ); letting be A be
⋃
B, we have
ψ
(
⋃
B)
0 ∨ ψ
(
⋃
B)
1 . If ψ
(
⋃
B)
0 let x be 0, and note that ψ
(
⋃
B)
0 → ψ
(y)
0 since
y ⊆
⋃
B. Similarly if ψ
(
⋃
B)
1 . Applying ∆0 Uniformity to the claim, we get
∃x ∈ {0, 1} ∀y ((x = 0∧ψ
(y)
0 )∨ (x = 1∧ψ
(y)
1 )). If the value of x which witnesses
this sentence is 0, then ∀y ψ
(y)
0 , and by induction ψ0. Similarly, if the value of x
which witnesses this sentence is 1, we get ψ1. Since either 0 or 1 witnesses this
sentence, ψ0 ∨ ψ1, as was to be shown.
Suppose φ = ∃u ∈ v ψ. Assume ∀A(∃u ∈ v ψ)(A), which equals ∀A ∃u ∈
v ψ(A). We claim ∀B ∃u ∈ v ∀y ∈ B ψ(y). To see this, again use the assumption
with A =
⋃
B. By ∆0 Uniformity, ∃u ∈ v ∀y ψ(y), and by induction ∃u ∈ v ψ.
The other cases are easier. If φ = ψ0 ∧ ψ1, ∀A(ψ0 ∧ ψ1)
(A) = ∀A(ψ
(A)
0 ∧
ψ
(A)
1 )→ ∀Aψ
(A)
0 ∧∀Aψ
(A)
1 → (by induction) ψ0∧ψ1. If φ = ∀u ∈ v ψ, ∀A (∀u ∈
v ψ)(A) = ∀A ∀u ∈ v ψ(A) → ∀u ∈ v ∀A ψ(A) → (by induction) ∀u ∈ v ψ. Fi-
nally, if φ = ∀uψ, suppose ∀A (∀uψ)(A) which equals ∀A (∀u ∈ Aψ(A)). It
follows that ∀u ∀B ψ(B): for arbitrary values v and C for u and B respectively,
let A = C ∪ {v} in the assumption above, yielding ∀u ∈ C ∪ {v}ψ(C∪{v})(u).
In particular, for u = v, ψ(C∪{v})(v), and, shrinking the bound, ψ(C)(v). So
∀u ∀B ψ(B)(u), and, by induction, ∀uψ(u).
In what follows, Π Persistence will refer to the theory IKP - ∆0 Bounding +
Π Persistence (or Π Uniformity or ∆0 Uniformity, from the proposition), as well
as to the axiom scheme, except when such an ambiguity might cause confusion.
Although KP and Π Persistence are equivalent classically, intuitionistically
they are (implicationally) incomparable, as follows. To see that IKP does not
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imply Π Persistence, consider the partial order that has a bottom element ⊥ and
ω-many incomparable nodes n (n ≥ 1) larger than it. Let the Kripke structure
M have LωCK
1
at ⊥, LωCKn (ω
CK
n being the nth admissible ordinal) at n, and
Id for transition functions. ⊥ |= IKP, as follows. M⊥ already contains ∅ and
ω, and the universe at each node is closed under pairing and union. These
universes are also transitive sets, and the ∈-relation ofM is merely a restriction
of ∈ (of V), so Extensionality and Foundation hold. Both ∆0 Comprehension
and ∆0 Bounding are based on the fact that sets in M don’t grow, or, to put
it more formally, Mn is an end-extension of M⊥. As a consequence, Excluded
Middle holds in M for ∆0 formulas. So for ∆0 Comprehension, suppose φ(x) is
a ∆0 formula with parameters from M⊥ = LωCK
1
, and X ∈ M⊥. Let A = { x
∈ X | φ(x)}. A ∈ LωCK
1
= M⊥, and ⊥ |= “ A = { x ∈ X | φ(x)}”. Regarding
∆0 Bounding, if ⊥ |= “f is total” then 1 |= “f is total”, and LωCK
1
|= “f is
total”. By the admissibility of LωCK
1
, A = rng(f) ∈ LωCK
1
. By Excluded Middle
and Absoluteness for ∆0 formulas, ⊥ |= “A = rng(f)”. But ∆0 Uniformity fails:
⊥ |= ∀a (∃n ∈ ω ∀x ∈ a if x is a sequence of admissible ordinals then length(x) <
n), but ⊥ 6|= ∃n ∈ ω ∀x (if x is a sequence of admissible ordinals then length(x)
< n).
In the other direction, consider ω as a partial order, and let αn be an ω-
sequence cofinal in ωCK1 . Let the Kripke model M have Lαn at node n (with
Id as the transition functions). It is easy to see that no node forces IKP: given
n, just pick a witness that Lαn is not admissible, such a witness being a ∆0
function unbounded in Lαn . But Π Persistence holds: Suppose for a node n,
n |= “∀A φ(A)” (and hence the same for all nodes m,m ≥ n). For A ∈ Lαn ,
φ(A) is ∆0, and Mm is an end-extension of Mn for m ≥ n; this means that the
truth of φ(A) can be determined locally, i.e. Lαn |= φ
(A). “A” ranges over all
sets in Lαm for all m ≥ n, hence over LωCK
1
, so we have LωCK
1
|= ∀A φ(A). By
Π Persistence classically, LωCK
1
|= φ. In showing that n |= φ, when unraveling
φ choices will have to be made, with ∃ and ∨. Use the truth of φ in LωCK
1
as a
guide.
So we have two different theories, IKP and Π Persistence. Is there a differ-
ence between the mathematics you can do in them? Yes, again by duality. We
have already seen that in IKP the least fixed point of a positive inductive Σ def-
inition is Σ1 definable. Classically it would follow that the greatest fixed point
of a positive inductive Π definition is Π1 definable. However, intuitionistically,
this latter property seems to require Π Persistence as well as IKP.
In a bit more detail, if Γ : P(X) → P(X) is a monotone inductive oper-
ator on X, let A be {Y |Y ⊆ Γ(Y )} and Γfix =
⋃
A. By the monotonicity of
Γ,Γfix ⊆ Γ(Γfix). Applying Γ again, Γ(Γfix) ⊆ Γ(Γ(Γfix)), so Γ(Γfix) ∈ A
and Γ(Γfix) ⊆ Γfix. Hence Γfix = Γ(Γfix), and Γfix is a fixed point. More-
over, by its definition, Γfix is the greatest fixed point. From the bottom up, let
Γ<β =
⋂
α<β Γα, Γβ = Γ(Γ<β), and Γ∞ =
⋂
β∈ORD Γβ . Γfix ⊆ Γβ , by induc-
tion on β, and Γ∞ is a fixed point, so Γfix = Γ∞. If Γ is given by a Π formula
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φ, then, over IKP + Π Persistence, “x ∈ Γβ” is a Π relation, by the duals of
the arguments for the Σ case. (This can be seen by adapting [1], III.1 and V.1
and 2. The satisfaction relation M |= φ[s] is ∆1 over IKP. That the universal
Π predicate Π-Sat(φ, s) can be defined as “∀Aφ(A)[s]” uses Π Persistence. This
fact is then plugged into the dual to the proof of the Second Recursion Theorem
to get that for all R-positive Π formulas φ(x, y, R) there is a Π formula ψ(x, y)
such that ψ(x, y) iff ψ(x, y, λx.ψ(x, y)). This suffices to get “x ∈ Γβ” to be a Π
relation of x and β.) Let M |= IKP + Π Persistence, and α = ORD(M). The
claim is that Γ<α = Γα. To see this, suppose x ∈ Γ<α, i.e. M |= ∀βφ(x,Γ<β), a
Π relation. Letting ΓA be
⋂
α∈A∩ORD Γα, M |= ∀Aφ(x,ΓA) (because β can be
chosen to be TC(A) ∩ ORD, and then Γ<β ⊆ ΓA), and M |= ∀A φ(A)(x,ΓA).
By Π Persistence, M |= φ(x,Γ<α), so x ∈ Γα and Γ<α ⊆ Γα. On general prin-
ciples Γα ⊆ Γ<α, so Γα = Γ<α, and Γ<α is a fixed point. Since Γ<α ⊇ Γ∞,
Γ<α = Γ∞.
So, while IKP suffices to get least fixed points to be Σ1 definable, it seems as
though Π Persistence is necessary to get greatest fixed points to be Π1 definable
(although, to be fair, such necessity has yet to be proven). Furthermore, the
second of the models above, intended to show that Π Persistence does not imply
IKP, also shows that Π Persistence doesn’t prove that lfp’s are Σ1 definable
(Kleene’s O has an appropriate inductive definition but is not Σ1 definable over
M.). So these two constructions, least and greatest fixed point, so near to each
other classically, are apparently more easily splittable intuitionistically. This
matter will be pursued in the questions at the end of this paper.
It bears observation that Π Persistence, as a theory, is quite weak, in that
one cannot easily construct sets in it. For instance, it does not even prove the
totality of the function α 7→ Lα, as the following model shows. Let 〈αn | n ∈ ω 〉
be a strictly increasing sequence of limit ordinals cofinal in ωCK1 . For X a set, let
Pair(X) be the set of all pairs from X (including singletons, as degenerate pairs),
Union(X) the set of all unions from X (i.e. {
⋃
x | x ∈ X}), and ∆0(X) the set of
all ∆0-definable subsets of members of X (assume here that X is transitive, just
for simplicity). Let Close(X) be X ∪ Pair(X) ∪ Union(X) ∪ ∆0(X). The Kripke
model under construction has for its partial order an increasing ω-sequence. For
node n, start with X0 = Lαn ∪αn+1, and let Xm+1 = Close(Xm). The n
th node
is
⋃
mXm (with the inclusion function as the transition functions). IKP - ∆0
Bounding is easily seen to hold, as is Π Persistence, by the same argument as
in the second model above. But αn is an ordinal at every node n and Lαn isn’t
a set until node n+1. (To see that Lαn is not a set at node n, show inductively
on m that for all finite Y ⊆ Xm Lαn 6⊆ TC(Y).)
It is an interesting question whether IKP + Π Persistence - ∆0 Bounding
proves the Π1 definability of greatest fixed points of positive inductive Π defini-
tions, or whether the full power of IKP + Π Persistence is needed. The status
of Π Persistence will be further pursued in the questions at the end.
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3 Classical Friends
In the following section we will turn to the intuitionistic versions of various
theories related to KP. Since these classical theories are not all well known,
though, a brief discussion of them for their own sakes is in order.
The axioms of interest to us are:
1. Σ1 Dependent Choice: If φ(x, y) is Σ1, and ∀x ∃y φ(x, y), then there is a
function f with domain ω such that ∀n φ(f(n), f(n+1)).
2. Resolvability: There is a ∆1 definable function f on the ordinals such that
V =
⋃
range(f).
3. Π2 Reflection: If ∀x ∃y φ(x, y), φ ∈ ∆0, then for every A there is a B ⊇
A such that ∀x ∈ B ∃y ∈ B φ(x, y).
4. ∆0 Bounding: from KP.
The implicational relations among these theories are as follows:
Σ1 DC + KP
ց
Π2 Reflection + KP → KP
ր
Resolvability + KP
Over the base theory KP - ∆0 Bounding, Resolvability alone implies nothing of
interest; after all, Lλ for any arbitrary limit λ is resolvable. Similarly, Σ1 DC
alone is rather weak, as Lω1·2 models Σ1 DC (because cf(ω1 · 2) > ω). However,
over this base theory Π2 Reflection itself picks up ∆0 Bounding.
All of these implications are easy to prove; for details see [1]. Furthermore,
in L they are all equivalent; this is also easy, and can be found in [1]. However,
if an implication does not follow from the preceding then it is not in general
true. Some of these non-implications are easy to see, and must certainly already
be known if not written down; others are actually a bit tricky. In any event
these proofs are not so easy to find in the literature, and they also provide the
models for the proofs in the next section, so it is well to include them here.
(For background on forcing, as well as arguments similar to those that follow,
including the use of symmetric submodels to falsify the Axiom of Choice, the
reader is referred to [4] and [5].)
1. Resolvability + KP + ¬Σ1 DC: Adjoin to LωCK
1
(or, for that matter,
to L |= ZF, for the stronger result Resolvability + ZF + ¬Σ1 DC) ω-many
Cohen reals (that is, reals generic for the forcing partial order 2<ω), as well
as the set (not sequence!) G consisting of all those reals. This is a symmetric
submodel of the model obtained by the set forcing to add an ω-sequence of
Cohen reals, hence is admissible. It is already a standard argument (see [5])
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that not even all of ZF is enough to build an ω-sequence of distinct elements of
G. This violation of the Axiom of Choice is actually a violation of Σ1 DC: let
φ(x, y) be “if x is a sequence of distinct elements of G then y is one also and is
a proper end-extension of x”. The function which shows Resolvability is f(α) =
Lα[G].
2. Σ1 DC + KP + ¬Resolvability: Adjoin to LωCK
1
any finite subset Gfin of
a countable set G of Cohen reals, and take the union of all such adjunctions: M
=
⋃
Gfin⊆G, Gfinfinite
LωCK
1
[Gfin]. Σ1 DC and ∆0 Bounding hold, as follows.
It suffices to consider formulas of the form ∃yφ(x, y), with φ(x, y) a ∆0 formula.
If ∃yφ(x, y) holds for a particular set x, then let Gfin ⊆ G be the finite set of
those reals used in the construction of x and of φ’s parameters (i.e. ∃yφ(x, y) is
a formula over LωCK
1
[Gfin]). We claim there is a witness y not merely in M, as
hypothesized, but already in LωCK
1
[Gfin]. To see this, let y witness ∃yφ(x, y) in
M. Let Gy ⊇ Gfin be a finite set such that y ∈ LωCK
1
[Gy ]. By the absoluteness
of ∆0 formulas, LωCK
1
[Gy] |= φ(x, y); again by absoluteness, Lα[Gy] |= φ(x, y)
for some α < ωCK1 . Gy\ Gfin is generic over LωCK
1
[Gfin] (for the forcing p.o.
which is the product of finitely many copies of 2<ω), hence the last assertion is
forced over LωCK
1
[Gfin] by some condition p: p |⊢ “Lα[Gy ] |= φ(x, y˚)”, where y˚
is a name for y. In LωCK
1
[Gfin] a generic over Lα[Gfin] through p can be built
(by the countability of Lα[Gfin] in LωCK
1
[Gfin]); let Gα be such a generic. Then
Lα[Gfin, Gα] |= φ(x, y˚(Gα)), where “y˚(Gα)” refers to the interpretation of y˚
with the canonical name for the generic interpreted as Gα. By the absoluteness
of ∆0 formulas LωCK
1
[Gfin] |= φ(x, y˚(Gα)), and LωCK
1
[Gfin] |= ∃y φ(x, y). Now
it’s easy to see that Σ1 DC holds in M. If M |= “∀x∃yφ(x, y)”, φ ∈ ∆0, then
LωCK
1
[Gfin] models the same. LωCK
1
[Gfin] also satisfies Σ1 DC, so contains an
appropriate ω-sequence, which by absoluteness also works in M. ∆0 Bounding
is similar.
Resolvability fails, as follows. Let f be a function over M (given via a ∆1
definition) with domain ORDM. Let Gfin be a finite subset of G such that
all of f’s parameters are in LωCK
1
[Gfin]. By the same argument as in the last
paragraph, since f is total over M, the same ∆1 definition produces the same
total function over LωCK
1
[Gfin]. So
⋃
range(f) ⊆ LωCK
1
[Gfin], which itself is a
proper subset of M, so
⋃
range(f) 6= M.
3. Π2-Reflection + ¬Σ1DC + ¬Resolvability: This is a combination of
the previous two arguments. To construct M, first adjoin an infinite set G of
Cohen reals, then all possible finite subsets of another such infinite set H. Σ1
DC and Resolvability fail as before. Π2 Reflection holds for much the same
reason that Σ1 DC did in the previous example. If M |= ∃yφ(x, y) then all
you need to build such a y is G and the finite subset Hfin of H used for x and
φ. So if M |= “∀x∃y φ(x, y)”, φ ∈ ∆0, and if A ∈ M, then LωCK
1
[G, Hfin]
|= “∀x∃y φ(x, y)” (Hfin merely being large enough to contain all of the reals
in H needed to construct φ’s parameters and A). Since LωCK
1
[G, Hfin] satisfies
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Π2 Reflection, it contains an appropriate B ⊇ A, as desired.
4. KP + ¬Π2-Reflection: The model from [8] suffices, and will be described
briefly here. A Steel generic tree over LωCK
1
is not well-founded but has no infi-
nite descending sequence in the generic extension. This forcing can be modified
slightly to include a distinguished path through the tree which does not destroy
admissibility. Force an ω-sequence of such trees < Tn > and paths < Bn >.
Let W be a recursive linear ordering of ω which is not well-founded but has no
hyperarithmetic infinite descending sequence. Think of the trees as ordered by
W. Let Mi be LωCK
1
[< Tn | n ∈ ω >,< Bn | n ≥W i >]. M =
⋃
i∈I Mi for
I some final segment of W with no least element, chosen exactly so that M is
admissible. In [8] it was observed that M falsifies Σ1 DC; in fact it’s even Π2
Reflection that fails: M |= “∀j if there is a branch through Tj then ∃i <W j
and a branch through Ti”, but any set in M is a set in some Mi, in which W
is still well-founded.
4 Intuitionistic Models
As remarked in the introduction, even though the constructions just given show
that none of these theories are equivalent to each other in general, in L they
all are. However, intuitionistically the ordinals do funny things. With Kripke
models there is an extra degree of freedom, the choice of the partial order. If
the underlying partial order is chosen to be some forcing partial order, then
by coding forcing conditions as small ordinals one could reasonably hope to
get a generic G, although still not in V, actually in LV [G]. This is basically
the approach followed in the upcoming arguments. Notice, though, that these
intuitions are not made precise. In particular, of the four constructions from
the preceding section, only three are adapted here, because we couldn’t see how
to do the fourth. The omitted one is Σ1 DC + KP + V=L + ¬Resolvability,
the problem being Σ1 DC. There’s no trouble picking some least set in classical
L, but IL does not apparently come equipped with a well-founded linear order.
4.1 General Considerations
There will be some common constructions in these models. It would be well to
isolate them, as well as to give some of the standard background on IORD and
IL.
4.1.1 Intuitionistic Ordinals
Intuitionistically, an ordinal is a transitive set of transitive sets. The standard
weak counter-example to show that the ordinals are not linearly ordered goes
as follows. Let α = {0 | φ}. α is an ordinal. If the ordinals are linearly ordered,
then α ∈ 0, α = 0, or 0 ∈ α. The first case is not possible, since 0 is the empty
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set. In the second case, ¬φ. In the last case, φ. So φ ∨ ¬φ. Hence if Excluded
Middle is to fail, then the ordinals are not linearly ordered. It is not hard to give
examples of non-classical ordinals in Kripke models. Let P be any partial order.
A trivial Kripke structure on P has some universe of sets M (with M’s ∈-relation)
at each node and the identity function as the transition functions. (Think of M
as a model of ZF, or a weaker set theory, or even the universe V for a class-sized
Kripke structure. A class-sized Kripke structure is like a Kripke structure, but
rather than requiring that the relations and functions in question (e.g. “is a
set at node σ”, or the transition functions between nodes) be sets, they must
merely be definable relations on a definable subset of V.) Consider a larger or
ambient Kripke structure, that is, a structure with the same partial order P
but more sets at each node. Any set in this ambient structure which at each
node contains only ordinals from the trivial Kripke structure is an intuitionistic
ordinal which cannot be construed as classical.
4.1.2 Intuitionistic Definability
Regarding IL, definability can be developed within IZF much as it is classically,
so def(X), the set of definable subsets of a set X, makes perfect sense. As usual,
the definition of Lα cannot depend on whether α is a limit or a successor, since
intuitionistically not every ordinal is a limit or a successor. So Lα is
⋃
β∈α
def(Lβ). For details see [7]. In what follows, however, we will typically not be
dealing with L as an inner model of an already given model of IZF, which is
merely the semantic version of L’s axiomatic development in IZF, hence implicit
in [7]. Rather, L will be handled sui generis: given a Kripke structure M for
the language of set theory, we will have occasion to consider def(M). While not
difficult, this could stand some exposition.
So suppose M is an extensional (x = y iff ∀z z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) Kripke
structure (with relations ∈ and =), with underlying partial order P, universe
Mσ at node σ, and transition functions fστ : Mσ → Mτ . In def(M), a set at
node σ is named by a formula φ(x) with free variable x and parameters from
M. A set is actually an equivalence class of such formulas, in which φ ∼σ ψ if
σ |=M ∀x [φ(x)↔ ψ(x)]. fστ : def(Mσ) → def(Mτ ) is given by the equation
fστ ([φ(x, y1, ..., yn)]σ) = [φ(x, fστ (y1), ..., fστ (yn))]τ ,
where y1, ..., yn are the parameters, and the notation fστ is used ambiguously
for transition functions in both M and def(M). fστ is well-defined, because
if φ ∼σ ψ, that is, if σ |=M ∀x [φ(x, y1, ..., yn) ↔ ψ(x, z1, ..., zm)], then,
by general lemmas on Kripke models, τ |=M ∀x [φ(x, fστ (y1), ..., fστ (yn)) ↔
ψ(x, fστ (z1), ..., fστ (zm))] (σ ≤ τ), or φ ∼τ ψ. Mσ can be embedded in
def(Mσ), with y being identified with the formula “x ∈ y”. This much be-
ing said, ∈ can now be interpreted: [φ]σ ∈ [ψ]σ iff [φ]σ = [y]σ for some y ∈
Mσ and σ |=M ψ(y). (Notice that this definition is independent of the choice
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of representative for [ψ]σ, by the definition of the equivalence relation; further-
more, there is at most one y such that y ∼σ φ, by the extensionality of M.)
Extensionality holds in def(M):
σ |=def(M) ∀x (x ∈ [φ]σ ↔ x ∈ [ψ]σ) iff
∀τ ≥ σ ∀x ∈Mττ |=def(M) [x] ∈ [φ]τ ↔ [x] ∈ [ψ]τ iff
∀τ ≥ σ ∀x ∈Mττ |=M φ(x)↔ ψ(x) iff
σ |=M ∀x [φ(x)↔ ψ(x)] iff
[φ]σ = [ψ]σ.
To summarize, if M is an extensional Kripke structure for the language
of set theory, so is def(M), and M can be canonically embedded in def(M).
Furthermore, def(M) can be construed as an end-extension of M, since if
σ |=def(M) [φ]σ ∈ [y]σ then [φ]σ = [z]σ for some z ∈ Mσ and σ |=M z ∈ y.
Also, this process can be iterated through the transfinite: starting with M0 =
M, let Mα+1 = def(Mα) and Mλ =
lim
→ {Mα | α < λ} (or, more colloquially,⋃
α<λMα). Mλ is also an extensional Kripke model end-extending each Mα.
Indeed, this process can be iterated not only along a well-founded linear
order, but also along a well-founded partial order. Suppose that X is a Kripke
structure (for the language of set theory) with underlying partial order P, and
that the partial order defined by
(σ, x) ≥ (τ, y)↔ σ ≤P τ ∧ τ |= y ∈ fστ (x)
(σ, τ ∈ P , x ∈ Xσ, y ∈ Xτ ) is well-founded. Then “def” can be iterated along
this p.o., as follows. Suppose inductively that for all (τ, y) ≤ (σ, x) def(M(τ,y))
is well-defined as a Kripke structure on the partial order P≥τ . Then M(σ,x) can
be defined as follows:
(M(σ,x))τ =
⋃
{y|τ |=y∈fστ (x)}
(def(M(τ,y)))τ .
Regarding the transition functions, consider [φ(z, y1, ..., yn)]τ ∈ (M(σ,x))τ . Then
[φ(z, y1, ..., yn)]τ ∈ (def((M(τ,y)))τ
where τ |= y ∈ fστ (x). Then let
fτρ([φ(z, y1, ..., yn)]τ ) := [φ(z, fτρ(y1), ..., fτρ(yn))]ρ,
since
[φ(z)]ρ ∈ (def(M(ρ,fτρ(y))))ρ ⊆ (M(σ,x))ρ,
the latter inclusion because ρ |= fτρ(y) ∈ fτρ(fστ (x)) = fσρ(x).
With M(σ,x) now defined, def(M(σ,x)) follows, using the “def” operator de-
veloped earlier in this section. The final structure MX is then given by
(MX)σ =
⋃
x∈Xσ
(def(M(σ,x)))σ.
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At this point a few words about absoluteness are in order. For starters, the
external concept “def” developed above is equivalent to the internal concept
“def”. In more detail, suppose that V is some classical meta-universe, and
M∈V is an extensional Kripke structure for the language of set theory, and N
= def(M), again in V. Suppose that K is a Kripke structure with the same
underlying partial order as M and N such that M, N ∈ K (so M and N are
sets in the sense of K). Then K |= N = def(M), where of course “def” in this
case is the traditional, internal concept of definability. We will not prove this
here; hopefully the external development of “def” was transparent enough to
make this assertion clear. This allows us in the following to be ambiguous as to
which version of “def” is intended.
Furthermore, the same holds for the iterations of “def”, both into the trans-
finite as well as along a well-founded partial order. In the first case, suppose α is
an ordinal and K a Kripke structure for the language of set theory (both in our
classical meta-universe V, of course). Suppose that there is an αK ∈ Kσ, σ ∈
P, such that (α,∈V) and (αK,∈Kσ ) are isomorphic, and that, for all τ ≥ σ, fστ
: αK → fστ (αK) is an isomorphism. Then σ |= “αK is an ordinal”, and αK
can be identified with α. Notice that this is nothing other than the extension of
the already common practice of using the notation “0” to denote the empty set
both in V and in a Kripke model, “1” as {0} again in V or in a Kripke model,
etc., and even “ω” for the ω of a Kripke model, so long as it contains only the
internalizations of the standard natural numbers. In addition, for M, N ∈ Kσ,
if N = Mα (the α-fold iteration of def, as defined above, of course interpreted
in V), then σ |= N = MαK . (This applies, of course, only when K has enough
set-theoretic power to express α-fold iteration of definability, e.g. in models of
IKP (see [7]).) In such a case we will feel free to use the notation α for both
the external and internal ordinal.
Regarding iterations along well-founded partial orders, let X be as above
(that is, a Kripke structure over P well-founded in the manner previously de-
scribed). Let N = MX , of course in V, and let K be a Kripke structure
containing X,M, and N as members. If K satisfies a sufficiently large fragment
of IZF then the X-fold iteration of def (notation: X-def) would be definable
and provably total. The inductive definition of “X-def” is none other than the
already well-known notion of the iteration of definability along an ordinal (i.e.
Lα), the point being that α’s ordinalhood is unnecessary for the intelligibility of
the notion: X-def(M) =
⋃
Y ∈X def(Y-def(M)). The result, again stated without
proof, is that K |= N = X-def(M).
A case of particular interest is when K |= “X is an ordinal”. Under this
circumstance we will use the more common notation α instead of X. For M
take the structure 0 = ∅K (equivalently, let 0 be the unique function from P to
{∅}). Then there is already standard notation for α-def(0), namely Lα. This
being the case, we will use the notation “Lα” for 0α for those α’s as above
which are ordinals in some Kripke structure, even if such Kripke structure has
not yet been introduced in the exposition. Then “Lα” can be interpreted either
13
externally or internally, as the occasion demands. (To keep the reader from
being distracted by concerns that any given α will indeed turn out to be an
ordinal in some ambient Kripke structure introduced in some unspecified future
section, please observe that ordinality is a ∆0 property for transitive sets, the
only kind we will be considering, and hence can be determined locally. We will
even go so far as to say that a transitive Kripke structure α is an ordinal (or a
Kripke ordinal) when it satisfies the intuitionistic definition of such, a transitive
set of transitive sets, even in the absence of an ambient Kripke universe, knowing
that such an α will be an ordinal in any ambient Kripke structure.)
4.1.3 General Constructions
In the following sections we will be constructing several Kripke models. Here we
bring together several steps common to them, in order not to have to do them
more than once. In every case we will begin by giving the underlying partial
order P; the steps given here are generic and applicable to all P’s, assuming
only that P has a bottom element ⊥. (After corollary 4.1.3, we will impose
more restrictions on P. Of course for the constructions themselves in future
sections, we will specify P explicitly.) Then we will define certain Kripke ordinals
with underlying partial order P. These ordinals will be based on the generic
reals from the classical forcing constructions of the last section; they will be
a kind of internalization of these reals, and will be very low in the power set
hierarchy (being collections of subsets of 1 = {0}). It should be noted that the
constructions here and in the coming sections take place of necessity in V: the
only Kripke structures in sight are those being built, and so of no use in their
own definitions.
Given a node σ in P, let 1σ be the set (Kripke set, if you will, as 1σ will
end up being a set in a Kripke structure) that looks like 0 unless you’re past or
incompatible with σ, where it’s 1:
[τ |= x ∈ 1σ]↔ [σ < τ ∨ σ ⊥ τ ] ∧ [τ |= x = ∅],
or, if you prefer,
(1σ)τ = ∅ ↔ τ ≤ σ
(1σ)τ = {∅} ↔ [σ < τ ∨ σ ⊥ τ ],
with the only possible transition functions (cf. the remark after definition 4.1.5).
1σ is an ordinal: ⊥ |= “if x ∈ 1σ then x = ∅”; since nothing is in ∅, 1σ is transitive,
and ∅ is transitive. (Recall that the intuitionistic definition of an ordinal as a
transitive set of transitive sets is ∆0 for transitive sets, and so can be determined
locally, without an ambient Kripke structure.) So L1σ is well-defined. What is
L1σ? If τ |= x ∈ L1σ , then, for some β, τ |= x ∈ def(Lβ) ∧ β ∈ 1σ. If τ ≤ σ
then τ 6|= β ∈ 1σ, so τ 6|= x ∈ L1σ for any x, and L1σ looks empty. Otherwise
τ |= β ∈ 1σ iff τ |= β = ∅. ⊥ |= L0 = ∅, and ⊥ |= def(L0) = {∅}. So if
τ |= x ∈ L1σ then τ |= x = ∅. In short, L1σ = 1σ.
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Furthermore, what’s definable over 1σ? Recall that when taking definitions
over a set, truth is evaluated in that set: a definable subset of 1σ is one of the
form { x ∈ 1σ | 1σ |= φ(x) }, where φ’s parameters must also come from 1σ. So
if both τ0, τ1 ≤ σ then τ0 |= “1σ |= φ(x)” iff τ1 |= “1σ |= φ(x)”; i.e. τ0 and τ1
force the same atomic facts about definable subsets of 1σ. Similarly if both τ0
and τ1 extend or are incompatible with σ. Since 1σ’s only possible member is
∅, the only possible member of a subset of 1σ is ∅; by the preceding remarks,
either ∅ is in a given subset at all nodes beyond or incompatible with σ or it’s
not. So def(L1σ ) = {0, 1σ}.
Let T be {1σ | σ ∈ P} (in V). Let Tˆ be a Kripke subset of T, that is,
Tˆσ ⊆ T and the transition functions are all the identity. Let Tˆ0 be such that
(Tˆ0)σ = Tˆσ ∪ {0}. Tˆ0 is an ordinal: T is a set of ordinals, so Tˆ ⊆ T is also, as is
Tˆ0. So Tˆ0 is a set of transitive sets. It is also transitive itself: if τ |= x ∈ y ∈ Tˆ0,
then either τ |= y = 0, which contradicts τ |= x ∈ y, or τ |= y ∈ Tˆ , i.e.
τ |= y = 1σ for some σ, and τ |= x = 0, and 0 ∈ Tˆ0.
Lemma 4.1.1 L
Tˆ0
= Tˆ0
proof: L
Tˆ0
=
⋃
α∈Tˆ0
def(Lα)
= [
⋃
α∈Tˆ def(Lα)] ∪ def(L0)
= [
⋃
1σ∈Tˆ
def(L1σ)] ∪ {0}
=
⋃
1σ∈Tˆ
{0, 1σ} ∪ {0}
= Tˆ0
Corollary 4.1.2 Tˆ is definable over L
Tˆ0
.
proof: Tˆ = Tˆ0 − {0} = {x | x 6= 0} as a definition over Tˆ0, since, for all
σ,⊥ |= 1σ 6= 0.
Corollary 4.1.3 Suppose {Tˆi | i ∈ I} is a collection of Kripke subsets of T.
Then {Tˆi0 | i ∈ I} ∪
⋃
{Tˆi0 | i ∈ I} is an ordinal, say ξ, and ∀i Tˆi ∈ Lξ.
Now suppose that P (the underlying partial order of the Kripke structure
to be built) is a tree of height ω. Also assume that P is nowhere degenerate,
meaning that each node has incompatible extensions. Much of what follows
would work in a more general context, but we have no need of such a detailed
investigation. We would like some internal notion of a branch through P; that
is, a Kripke set that behaves as such. Given an external branch B (that is, a
branch through P in the classical sense), the obvious internalization of B would
be {1σ | σ ∈ B}. But if τ is perpendicular to any member of B, then at node
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τ this looks like {1}. Even worse, ¬¬ B = {1}, and it’s not possible to get two
such branches forced at any node to be unequal. Hence we would like branches
that reappear even after you’ve fallen off of them.
In the following, we explicitly distinguish between those definitions and lem-
mas that of necessity are to be evaluated inV (labeled “external”), because they
refer to non-Kripke objects, and those, labeled “internal”, that can be evaluated
in an appropriate Kripke structure (meaning one containing certain parameters
or satisfying certain exioms from IZF).
Definition 4.1.4 (external) Pˆ is the full Kripke subset of T; that is, Pˆσ = T.
The following Kripke-internal definition is ∆0, and hence can be evaluated
and applied (such as in the definition and lemma thereafter) in any transitive
Kripke set containing Pˆ even without an ambient Kripke universe. (Cf. the
comments on ordinality at the end of section 4.1.2.)
Definition 4.1.5 (internal) B ⊆ Pˆ is a branch through Pˆ if
1. α ⊇ β ∈ B → α ∈ B,
2. ∀α, β ∈ B α ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ α, and
3. ∀γ ∈ Pˆ ((∀β ∈ B (γ ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ γ))→ γ ∈ B).
The reader may have wondered why 1σ was taken as being 1 at nodes incom-
patible with σ, instead of 0, which might first have come to mind. The answer
is clause 1) in the definition above. Otherwise, if we had defined (1σ)τ = ∅ for
τ ⊥ σ, then consider what would hold of a branch, i.e. let ρ |= “B is a branch
through Pˆ”. By clause 3) ρ |= “B 6= ∅”, so let σ be such that ρ |= “1σ ∈ B”. In
practice it will be easy to extend ρ to τ ⊥ σ; then τ |= “1σ ∈ B”. τ |= “1σ = 0”
because P is a tree (i.e. ∀τ ′ ≥ τ τ ′ ⊥ σ), so τ |= “0 ∈ B”. By clause 1) then
τ |= “B = Pˆ”, which would then run afoul of clause 2). So in order to have
branches at all, 1σ needed to be defined as it was.
Definition 4.1.6 (external) If σ |= U ⊆ Pˆ then for τ ≥ σ extτ (U) = {ρ ≥ τ |
τ |= 1ρ ∈ U}: “the externalisation of U at τ”.
Lemma 4.1.7 (external) σ |= “B is a branch through Pˆ” iff for all τ ≥ σ
extτ (B) is a branch through P≥τ and 1⊥ ∈ Bσ.
proof: Recall that the notation Tr≥τ for a tree Tr means the subtree of nodes
extending τ (including τ itself) and the notation Xσ for a Kripke set X refers
to the collection of elements forced at σ into X. Recall also that a branch of a
tree classically is a non-empty, linearly ordered subset of a tree which is closed
downwards and (if the tree has no terminal leaves, as in our context) has no
final element.
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→ : Suppose τ ≥ σ.
a) extτ (B) is non-empty: For τ = ⊥ ⊥ |= “∀β ∈ Pˆ β ⊆ 1⊥”. By clause 3)
in the definition of a branch, ⊥ |= “1⊥ ∈ B”, so ⊥ ∈ ext⊥(B). For τ 6= ⊥ τ |=
“∀β ∈ Pˆ β = 1 ∨ β ⊆ 1τ”. Again by clause 3), τ |= “1τ ∈ B”, and τ ∈ extτ (B).
b) extτ (B) is linearly ordered: Suppose ρ, ξ ∈ extτ (B). Then τ |= “1ρ, 1ξ ∈
B”. By clause 2) in the definition of a branch, τ |= “1ρ ⊆ 1ξ ∨ 1ξ ⊆ 1ρ”.
If ρ and ξ were incompatible, then ρ 6|= “1ξ ⊆ 1ρ” and ξ 6|= “1ρ ⊆ 1ξ”. This,
however, contradicts the semantics of “∨” in Kripke structures, by which one of
the two disjuncts must hold. Hence ρ and ξ are compatible.
c) extτ (B) is closed downwards: Suppose ρ ∈ extτ (B) and τ ≤ ξ ≤ ρ. Then
τ |= “1ρ ∈ B” and τ |= “1ρ ⊆ 1ξ”. By clause 1) in the definition of a branch,
τ |= “1ξ ∈ B”, and ξ ∈ extτ (B).
d) extτ (B) has no final element: Suppose to the contrary that ρ is the final
element of extτ (B). Consider extρ(B). From the proof of part a) above, ρ ∈
extρ(B). If extρ(B) = {ρ}, then let pi be an immediate successor of ρ (which
exists since P was assumed to have an ordinal height and no degenerate nodes;
see the comments after corollary 4.1.3). Again from part a), we have already
seen that pi |= “∀β ∈ Pˆ β = 1 ∨ β ⊆ 1pi”; since branches are, by definition,
subsets of Pˆ , we have in particular pi |= “∀β ∈ B 1pi ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1pi”. At an
extension ξ of ρ incompatible with pi, ξ |= “1pi = 1”, so ξ |= “∀β ∈ B β ⊆ 1pi”.
Finally, at ρ itself, the only element forced at ρ into B is, by hypothesis, 1ρ, and
ρ |= “1pi ⊆ 1ρ”. To summarize, ρ |= “∀β ∈ B 1pi ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1pi”. By clause 3),
ρ |= “1pi ∈ B”, and pi ∈ extρ(B), contrary to hypothesis. So extρ(B) 6= {ρ}.
Let pi 6= ρ be some member of extρ(B). We will show that pi ∈ extτ (B),
contradicting the choice of ρ as the final element of extτ (B). This argument, once
again, uses clause 3). Our goal is to show that τ |= “∀β ∈ B 1pi ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1pi”.
Once that is accomplished, it follows that τ |= “1pi ∈ B”, which means pi ∈
extτ (B).
So let ξ ≥ τ . If ξ and ρ are incompatible, then so are ξ and pi (pi extends
ρ). So ξ |= “1pi = 1”, and 1 is a superset of every member of Pˆ . If ξ and ρ
are compatible, then either ρ ≤ ξ or τ ≤ ξ < ρ. In the first case, ξ |= “1pi ∈
B”, because ρ models the same. By clause 2) in the definition of a branch,
ξ |= “∀β ∈ B 1pi ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1pi”. In the second case, τ ≤ ξ < ρ, we have in
any case ξ |= “1ρ ∈ B”, because τ models the same. If ξ |= “β ∈ B”, then by
clause 2) ξ |= “1ρ ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1ρ”. If ξ |= “1ρ ⊆ β” then ξ |= “1pi ⊆ β”, because
ξ |= “1pi ⊆ 1ρ”. If, on the other hand, ξ |= “β ⊆ 1ρ”, then ρ |= “β ⊆ 1ρ”. That
implies that β = 1µ for some µ ≥ ρ. Furthermore, by clause 2), ρ |= “1pi ⊆ 1µ”
or ρ |= “1µ ⊆ 1pi”. In the first case we have pi ≥ µ, in the second µ ≥ pi, and in
either case ξ |= “1pi ⊆ 1µ” or ξ |= “1µ ⊆ 1pi”.
Finally, for this direction of the proof it remains to show that 1⊥ ∈ Bσ.
⊥ |= “∀β ∈ Pˆ β ⊆ 1⊥”. By clause 3), σ |= “1⊥ ∈ B”.
←:
1. σ |= “α ⊇ β ∈ B → α ∈ B”: Suppose σ |= “1τ ⊇ 1ρ ∈ B”. If τ⊥σ or
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τ < σ then σ |= “1τ = 1 = 1⊥ ∈ B”. Otherwise τ ≥ σ. Then τ ≤ ρ,
because otherwise τ |= “1ρ = 1” and τ 6|= “1τ = 1”. Since ρ ∈ extσ(B),
which is by hypothesis a branch, and hence closed downwards, we have
τ ∈ extσ(B), i.e. σ |= “1τ ∈ B”.
2. σ |= “∀α, β ∈ B α ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ α”: Suppose σ |= “1τ , 1ρ ∈ B”. If
τ⊥σ or τ < σ then σ |= “1τ = 1 ⊇ 1ρ”. Similarly if ρ⊥σ or ρ < σ.
So τ, ρ ≥ σ. By hypothesis τ, ρ ∈ extσ(B), which is a branch, and hence
linearly ordered; therefore τ ≤ ρ or ρ ≤ τ , implying ⊥ |= “ρ ⊆ τ” or
⊥ |= “τ ⊆ ρ” respectively.
3. σ |= “∀γ ∈ Pˆ (∀β ∈ B γ ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ γ → γ ∈ B)”: Suppose σ |= “∀β ∈
B 1τ ⊆ β ∨ β ⊆ 1τ”. If τ⊥σ or τ < σ then σ |= “1τ = 1 = 1⊥ ∈ B”.
Otherwise τ ≥ σ. If τ were incompatible with some ρ ∈ extσ(B), then
τ 6|= “1ρ ⊆ 1τ” and ρ 6|= “1τ ⊆ 1ρ”, yielding σ 6|= “1τ ⊆ 1ρ ∨ 1ρ ⊆ 1τ”,
contrary to the hypothesis. Since extσ(B) as a branch is a maximal linearly
ordered subset of P≥σ, τ ∈ extσ(B), and σ |= “1τ ∈ B”.
4.2 Resolvability + IKP + V=L + ¬Σ1 DC
To be perfectly clear, we really should state what Resolvability means in this
context. The standard definition, that there is a ∆1-definable function f : ORD
→ V such that V =
⋃
rng(f), is perfectly coherent, but could be contested as
not being the appropriate correlate to classical resolvability in an intuitionistic
setting. After all, maybe the linearity of the domain is what’s vital, so a res-
olution should have domain some linearly ordered set of ordinals, presumably
a ∆1 definable set of ordinals. We will take the latter as the definition of a
resolution, because it seems to be a more difficult definition to fit (although it
is not clear that a function defined on a ∆1 set of ordinals could be extended to
all the ordinals), and point out that if V = L then α 7→ Lα shows resolvability
according to the former notion of a resolution. In fact, the resolution we will be
offering will even be extendable to a ∆1 function on the whole model.
The underlying partial order of the model will be 2<ω, with the order being
end-extension (σ < τ iff τ is a proper end-extension of σ.). For each real R :
ω → 2 there is a canonical branch B(R) through T:
extτ (B(R)) = {ρ ≥ τ | ∀j length(τ) ≤ j < length(ρ)→ τ(j) = R(j)},
or, equivalently,
B(R)τ = {1ρ | ρ < τ ∨ ρ ⊥ τ ∨ (ρ ≥ τ ∧ ∀j length(τ) ≤ j < length(ρ)→ τ(j) = R(j))}.
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B(R) is a branch by the preceding lemma. Notice that if R0 and R1 differ
cofinally then ⊥ |= B(R0) 6= B(R1).
Start with a model V of classical ZF. Let G := {Gi | i ∈ ω} be a set of reals
mutually Cohen-generic over V (that is, reals generic for the forcing partial
order 2<ω). Actually, the rest of this section save the last lemma applies just as
well to any set of (mutually cofinally differing) reals. (This last fact we will use
in section 4.4, where many constructions and lemmas similar to those below are
used, often with the offered proof being merely a reference to the corresponding
proof here, even though the real there is not even generic.) In V[G], construct
the (Kripke) branches B(Gi), i ∈ ω. For convenience, call the branch B(Gi) just
Bi. Consider {Bi | i ∈ ω} ∪ {Pˆ}. Let ξ be the (Kripke) ordinal from corollary
4.1.3 applied to this set; in particular, each Bi and Pˆ is a member of Lξ.
Lemma 4.2.1 {Bi | i ∈ ω} is definable over Lξ, as the set of branches through
Pˆ .
proof: Lξ =
⋃
α∈Pˆ0
def(Lα) ∪
⋃
i∈ω def(LBi0 ) ∪ def(LPˆ0). The first union is
just Pˆ0, by lemma 4.1.1, which doesn’t contain a branch. Each term in the
second union, def(LBi0 ), is just def(Bi0), again by 4.1.1. No branch contains
0, because, if it did, by clause 1) in the definition of a branch, it would then
contain all of Pˆ , contradicting clause 2). So any branch which is a subset of
Bi0 is also a subset of Bi. But Bi is itself a branch, and no proper subset of
a branch is a branch, because of clause 3), as follows. Suppose B is a branch,
Bˆ ⊆ B, and Bˆ is also a branch. If γ ∈ B and β ∈ Bˆ, β ∈ B too; using that B
is a branch, γ ⊆ β or β ⊆ γ by clause 2). Since Bˆ is a branch, γ ∈ Bˆ by clause
3). So B ⊆ Bˆ, and B = Bˆ. In the final case, def(L
Pˆ0
), or, more simply, again
by 4.1.1, def(Pˆ0), consider any definition, say φ(x), over Pˆ0. It contains only
finitely many parameters 1σ. Go to a node τ beyond or incompatible with all
such σ’s. τ |= φ(1ρ) for some extension ρ of τ iff τ |= φ(1ρ) for all extensions ρ of
τ of the same length, by symmetry. (There is an automorphism of Pˆ0 switching
any given pair of ρ’s.) So φ does not define a branch.
The model M can now be defined inductively:
M0 = Lξ;
Mα+1 = def(Mα);
Mλ =
⋃
α<λ
Mα; and
M =MωCK
1
.
Lemma 4.2.2 M |= IKP.
19
proof: Most of the axioms depend on the fact that if β > α thenMβ is an end-
extension of Mα. For instance, as has already been mentioned, Mα is proven
to be extensional inductively on α, using this end-extension property for the
limit cases. As another example, consider Pairing. If y, z ∈ M, let α be such
that y, z ∈ Mα. Now consider [“x = y ∨ x = z”] ∈ Mα+1. This set is the
pair {y, z} in Mα+1; since M end-extends Mα+1, the same fact holds in M.
Empty and Union are similar. ∆0 Comprehension also depends on this, being
the reason ∆0 formulas are absolute between Mα andM. (So if φ(x) is ∆0, and
all of its parameters, as well as X, are in Mα, then [x ∈ X ∧ φ(x)] ∈ Mα+1
is the desired subset in M.) Even Foundation uses end-extensionality. Suppose
M 6|= Foundation. Let φ and σ be such that σ |= ∀x((∀y ∈ x φ(y)) → φ(x))
and σ 6|= ∀x φ(x). Let τ ≥ σ and x ∈ (Mα)τ be such that τ 6|= φ(x); moreover,
assume that α is the least such ordinal. By the choice of α, if y ∈ (Mβ)ξ (β < α)
then ξ |= φ(y). By end-extensionality, if ξ |= y ∈ x then y ∈Mβ, some β < α.
So τ |= ∀y ∈ x φ(y), hence, by hypothesis, τ |= φ(x), a contradiction. So M |=
Foundation.
For ∆0 Bounding, M can be considered to be constructed by a Σ1 induc-
tion over the standard LωCK
1
[G], so any ∆0(M) formula φ is equivalent to a
∆0(LωCK
1
[G]) formula φ∗. (This would be proven inductively on formulas, with,
for instance, φ→ ψ going to ∀σ ∈ 2<ωσ |= φ→ σ |= ψ. The important observa-
tion is that only bounded quantifiers are added.) So ifM |= “∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y)”
then in LωCK
1
[G] ∀x ∈M A ∃α ∃y ∈ Mα φ∗(x, y), and by the admissibility of
LωCK
1
[G] the α’s needed can be bounded.
M also satisfies Infinity. To see this, define inductively on n ∈ ω the set
n ∈ M, the internal version of n, as follows: 0 = ∅M, n+ 1 = (n ∪ {n})M.
Inductively, n ∈Mn; in fact, n+ 2 ∈Mn. Definably over Mω, let ω be {α | α
is an ordinal, and either α = 0 or α is a successor, and ∀β ∈ α β is 0 or a
successor}. ω witnesses that M |= Infinity; moreover, one can show inductively
that ω ∩Mn = {m | m ≤ n+ 2}, so ω = {n | n ∈ ω}.
Lemma 4.2.3 M is resolvable.
proof: The resolution of M will be along ωCK1 , which is meant as the internal-
ization of ωCK1 , as ω is for ω. ω
CK
1 is defined (in V[G]) as { α | α < ω
CK
1 },
where α ∈ M is { β | β < α }. We need to show that for α < ωCK1 α ∈ M.
Say that an M-ordinal is standard if it’s 0, the successor of a standard ordinal,
or an ω- limit of standard ordinals. Notice that this definition is internal to M.
By the Second Recursion Theorem, there is a Σ definition of standardness in
M. Inductively on α ≥ ω, the standard ordinals in Mα are a subset of α. To
show that for α < ωCK1 , α ∈M, assume inductively that for β < α β ∈M. By
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the admissibility of the ambient universe (i.e. LωCK
1
[G]), there is a γ such that
for each β < α both β and a witness that β is standard are in Mγ . (Here, a
witness to standardness is a witness to the Σ definition of standardness.) Then
either α is definable over Mγ as the set of standard ordinals, or α is already in
Mγ . Hence ωCK1 ⊆ M.
In order to have a resolution along ωCK1 , we need it ∆1 definable. It’s already
Σ definable, as the set of standard ordinals. But the witnesses to standardness
are not really far away from α itself. That is, classically, a witness to the
standardness of α, consisting of suitable predecessors and cofinal ω-sequences,
could be found in Lα+ω. So to see whether α is standard in M, look in Lα+ω.
The function α 7→ Lα is total in M|= IKP (see [7]), so the Σ1 definition of “α is
not standard” is “there is a set Lα+ω and there is no witness in that set that α is
standard”. The Σ definition of standardness is equivalent to a Σ1 formula. Now
we need to check that this suffices for the notion of ∆1 defined earlier. Recall
that toward the beginning of section 2 a ∆1 property of a variable x was defined
as being given by a pair of ∆0 formulas φ(x, y), ψ(x, y) with free variables x, y
such that
∀x[∃y¬¬(φ(x, y) ∨ ψ(x, y)) ∧ ∀y¬(φ(x, y) ∧ ψ(x, y))].
So let φ(x, y) be
x ∈ ORD ∧ y = 〈z0, z1〉 ∧ z1 witnesses that z0 = Lx+ω
∧ ∃w ∈ z0 w witnesses that x is standard,
and ψ(x, y) be
(x 6∈ ORD) ∨ (x ∈ ORD ∧ y = 〈z0, z1〉 ∧ z1 witnesses that z0 = Lx+ω
∧ ∀w ∈ z0 w does not witness that x is standard),
where “x+α” is defined inductively on α even for non-ordinals x in the obvious
way. For ordinals x there is certainly a y as desired, and it is also clear that
∀x ¬¬(x ∈ ORD ∨ x 6∈ ORD). The challenge presented by the formalism as
set up is that the y must be chosen before it is decided whether x is an ordinal
or not. Here we have to use the development from the penultimate paragraph
of section 4.1.2, in which iterations of definability along well-founded (and not
necessarily well-ordered) lengths were developed. Let z0 be (x + ω)-def(0) and
z1 an appropriate construction of such. If x ever turns out to be an ordinal,
then z0 is automatically Lx+ω. With this φ and ψ, the notion “α is standard”
is shown to be ∆1 definable.
From here, the resolution of M is its very definition. Lξ is needed as a
parameter, which is no problem because it exists as a set in M: Lξ is definable
over M0 = Lξ as { x | x = x }, and so is in M1. “Y =
⋃
X” is a Σ relation, as
is “Y = def(X)” (for details on the latter, see [7]). So α→Mα is definable via
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Σ recursion as a Σ relation, hence Σ1 also. Any Σ1 definable function is ∆1,
even with the notion of ∆1 operable here, for the same reason as in the classical
context, as follows. Suppose the relation f(x) = y is definable as ∃z φ(x, y, z).
Then let ψ(x, y, w, z) be φ(x,w, z) ∧ y 6= w. Then indeed
∀x, y[∃w, z¬¬(φ(x, y, z) ∨ ψ(x, y, w, z)) ∧ ∀w, z¬(φ(x, y, z) ∧ ψ(x, y, w, z))].
Hence M is resolvable.
Lemma 4.2.4 M |= V=L.
proof: First observe that LM |= IKP. Extensionality and Foundation hold,
because LM is a definable sub-class of a model of Extensionality and Foundation.
Pairing is simple: if x ∈ Lα and y ∈ Lβ then x, y ∈ Lα∪β, and {x, y} ∈ def(Lα∪β)
= L(α∪β)+1. Union is similar: if x ∈ Lα then
⋃
x ∈ def(Lα) = Lα+1. ∅ ∈ def(L0)
= L1, and ω ∈ def(Lω) = Lω+1 to satisfy Infinity; for details on the latter, see [7].
For ∆0 Comprehension, consider { x ∈ X | φ(x) }, φ a ∆0 formula. Let α be such
that Lα contains X as well as φ’s parameters. Then { x ∈ X | φ(x) } ∈ def(Lα) =
Lα+1. Even ∆0 Bounding is smooth. Suppose ∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ LM φ(x, y), φ∆0.
In M, ∀x ∈ X ∃α ∃y ∈ Lα φ(x, y). By Σ Bounding in M, let A be a set
of ordinals such that ∀x ∈ X ∃α ∈ A ∃y ∈ Lα φ(x, y). Let β = A ∪
⋃
A.
∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ Lβ φ(x, y), and Lβ ∈ LM, showing ∆0 Bounding.
For any α < ωCK1 , since α ∈M, Lα ∈M. α is definable over Lα, so α ∈ L
M.
Also, {Bi | i ∈ ω} ∈ M, as is Pˆ , so ξ ∈ M, and Lξ ∈ LM. Finally, induction
shows that any admissible set containing Lξ as well as each α < ωCK1 must
contain all of M. The crucial fact needed in this induction is that the function
X 7→ def(X) is ∆1 definable, provably in IKP. This was essentially done in [7],
even though it was not flagged as such. There it was shown, in IZF, that this
function in ∆1 over all β > αaug + 7, where X ∈ Lαaug and αaug is defined
inductively as
⋃
{γaug | γ ∈ α} ∪ {α} ∪ (ω + 1). (The purpose of this definition
is to get ω into α, hereditarily, as the carrier of syntax.) The proof is that a
witness to “Y = def(X)” is definable over Lαaug+7, so IZF isn’t necessary; all you
need is some ordinal containing as a member αaug +7. Moreover, the recursion
theorem shows that in IKP + Infinity the function α 7→ αaug + 7 is total. So
in IKP, X 7→ def(X) is ∆1. This allows the inductive proof that Mα ∈ LM,
α ∈ ωCK1 .
Lemma 4.2.5 M |= ¬Σ1 DC.
proof: This is where we will use the particular choice of the Gi’s. Consider
the relation φ(X, Y) “if X is an n-tuple of distinct elements of {Bi | i ∈ ω}
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then Y is an end-extension of X also of distinct elements”. Any function f with
domain ω satisfying φ(f(i), f(i+1)) (and starting from ∅) would easily produce
an ω-sequence through {Gi | i ∈ ω} of distinct elements, of which there are
none in V[G], much less LωCK
1
[G], to say nothing of M.
4.3 Π2-Reflection + IKP + V=L + ¬Σ1DC+ ¬Resolvability
Recall the definition of a resolution (see section 4.2) as being a ∆1-definable
function f : O→V such that V =
⋃
rng(f) and O ⊆ ORD is ∆1-definable and
linearly ordered. In the last section, the argument works just as well for this
definition as for the classical one (O = ORD, of course not mentioning the
requirement of the linear order). Here, though, it wouldn’t. If V = L then
f(α) = Lα is a classical resolution of V. Hence the need here for a non-classical
notion of a resolution.
The underlying partial order is 2<ω, as before.
Let G and H be countable sets of mutual Cohen generics. The ambient
universe will be
⋃
Hfin
LωCK
1
[G ∪ Hfin], where Hfin ranges over the finite subsets
of H. Within this universe the full intuitionistic model Mbig can be defined
inductively, just like forcing: a set at stage α is a function that, for each node
σ ∈ 2<ω, picks out a collection of sets from stages < α (and this collection must
grow as σ grows).
More precisely, supposeM is an extensional Kripke model (for the language
of set theory) with underlying partial order P and transition functions fστ within
a classical universe V. P(M), the power set of M, can be defined similarly to
the way def(M) was defined in section 4.1. A set in P(M) at a node σ is a
function f with domain P≥σ such that f(τ) ⊆ Mτ , and if x ∈ f(σ) then fστ (x)
∈ f(τ). The transition function fστ is restriction: fστ (f) = f ↑ P≥τ . M can be
embedded in P(M), with x ∈Mσ being identified with the function f such that
f(τ) = { y ∈ Mτ | y ∈ fστ (x) }. By the extensionality of M, this embedding
is 1-1. σ |= “f ∈ g” if f is the image of some x under this embedding, and
x ∈ g(σ). P(M) is easily seen to be extensional, and an end-extension of M.
Furthermore, this process of taking the power set can be iterated transfinitely:
M0 =M,Mα+1 = P(Mα), andMλ =
lim
→ {Mα | α < λ} (or, more colloquially,⋃
α<λMα). If α > β then Mα is an extensional end-extension of Mβ.
In the current context, V is
⋃
Hfin
LωCK
1
[G ∪ Hfin]. V |= KP, but V does
not satisfy Power Set, so some care must be taken in the construction of P(M).
We start with M being the empty structure – Mσ = ∅ – but we do not claim
that eachMα is a set. Rather, the generation of theMα-hierarchy is given by a
Σ1 induction, so the relation “f ∈ (Mα)σ” is Σ1. Let Mbig be MωCK
1
. The final
model M is LMbig ; that this definition makes sense (i.e. that α 7→ Lα is a total
∆1-definable function via the standard definitions) is implied by the following
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lemma.
Lemma 4.3.1 Mbig |= IKP.
proof: For Empty, the function f(σ) = ∅ is in M1. For Infinity, defining ω as
in the previous section, the function f(σ) = ω is in Mω+1. For Pairing, if x, y
∈ Mα, let f(σ) in Mα+1 be {x, y}. For Union, if x ∈ Mα, then f(σ) =
⋃
x(σ)
is also in Mα. Extensionality was already remarked as holding. For ∆0 Com-
prehension, by end-extensionality a ∆0 formula overMbig is equivalent to a ∆0
formula in V, and ∆0 Comprehension in V suffices. For Foundation, suppose to
the contrary that σ |= ∀x(∀y ∈ x φ(y) → φ(x)), but σ 6|= ∀xφ(x). Let α be the
least ordinal such that for some x ∈Mα, τ ≥ σ τ 6|= φ(x). But if ξ |= y ∈ x then
y ∈Mβ , so ξ |= φ(y). Hence τ |= ∀y ∈ x φ(y), and τ |= φ(x), a contradiction.
Finally, for ∆0 Bounding, suppose σ |= ∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y), φ a ∆0 formula.
Then in V ∀τ ≥ σ ∀x ∈ Aτ ∃α ∃y ∈Mα τ |= φ(x, y). By ∆0 Bounding in V,
the αs needed can be bounded, say by β, and again by ∆0 Bounding in V a
bounding set B in Mβ+1 can be constructed.
Corollary 4.3.2 M |= V=L.
proof: This is the basic result of [7].
Lemma 4.3.3 M |= IKP + Π2 Reflection.
proof: The minor axioms of IKP are all easy. (For Extensionality, use the
fact that M is a transitive sub-class of the extensional Mbig. For Foundation,
use the definability of M inside of the well-founded Mbig.) ∆0 Comprehension
follows from the definition of L and the absoluteness of ∆0 formulas, just as in
the classical case. ∆0 Bounding follows from Π2 Reflection. For Π2 Reflection,
suppose M |= ∀x ∃y φ(x, y), φ a ∆0 formula, and A is a set in M. We will
enlarge A to a transitive model of the same sentence. Work in the ambient
universe V. All of the parameters in sight (i.e. A and those of φ) are members
of LωCK
1
[G ∪ Hfin] for a fixed Hfin. Moreover, for any ∆0(M) formula φ, there
is an equivalent ∆0(V) formula φ
∗, exactly as in 4.2.2. By standard symmetry
arguments, no more members of H are needed to find witnesses y in V. So for
each x in A let αx be an ordinal such that a witness for x is in Lαx [G ∪ Hfin].
Moreover, Lαx [G ∪ Hfin] should also include all the relevant evidence that the
witness is in M. Using the admissibility of the ambient universe, let α0 bound
the αx’s needed. Of course, this must be iterated to account for the new sets in
Lα0 [G ∪ Hfin] which are in L
M (via an ordinal also in Lα0 [G ∪ Hfin]). Iterate
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ω-many times. Let α be
⋃
αn, and β be {x | x is an ordinal inMbig} over Lα[G
∪ Hfin]. Lβ reflects φ.
Lemma 4.3.4 M |= ¬Σ1DC.
proof: As in 4.2.5, there can be no sequence of distinct members of {B(R) | R ∈
G}, which is a set in L.
Lemma 4.3.5 M |= ¬Resolvability.
proof: This argument is somewhat technical, but since the idea is rather simple
we will give a quick overview of it. Suppose there were such a resolution. Since
M is definable in the ambient universe, so is this resolution. Any definition can
use only finitely many parameters, in particular only finitely many members
of H. Consider branches of the form B(R), R ∈ H. Which ordinal each gets
attached to is determined by some forcing condition. Furthermore, beyond the
finitely many parameters, such a forcing condition need mention only (that is,
is an initial segment of) R. By mutual genericity, for every initial segment of a
real there are infinitely many R’s that share that initial segment. So any forcing
condition attaching B(R) to an ordinal forces infinitely many different B(R)’s
to that same ordinal. Therefore there is a set which contains infinitely many
B(R)’s, R ∈ H, a contradiction.
The following proof makes essential use of the definability of the forcing
relation “p |⊢ φ” over the ground model LωCK
1
[G] for the forcing partial order
to get the set H. The forcing partial order is { p | p : ω → 2<ω, supp(p) finite},
where supp(p), the support of p, is { n ∈ ω | p(n) 6= ∅}. The resulting generic is
(trivially identifiable with) a function fH with domain ω and range H. We will
assume that the forcing language has a constant Hn for each n ∈ ω, which is
interpreted in the generic extension as fH(n), as well as constants for fH itself
and for the range of fH , for which we will ambiguously use the symbols fH and
H respectively (fH and H being also sets in the generic extension; in effect, the
constant H will be interpreted as the set H and similarly for fH ; whether the
constant symbol or its interpretation is meant every time we say “H” of “fH”
should be clear from the context). To name the elements in the generic extenion
LωCK
1
[G, H] it suffices to consider the language generated by the symbols H and
the Hn’s; fH is not necessary. To name the elements in M it suffices to consider
the language generated by the Hn’s; H is not necessary. (Recall the definition
of V, over which M was defined.)
M is a structure definable over LωCK
1
[G, H], and so the truth predicate
over M, “σ |= φ”, is also definable over LωCK
1
[G, H]. It follows that the forcing
25
relation p |⊢ “σ |= φ” is definable over LωCK
1
[G]. If the reader feels uncomfortable
with the indirectness hidden behind the simple notation (M being a definable
sub-class of Mbig, itself a union not of sets but of definable classes), then to
save the trouble of the detailed argument needed to prove the definability of
the forcing relation, with just a tad more set-theoretic power we can take the
ground model to be LωCK
2
[G], ωCK2 the first admissible ordinal after ω
CK
1 . (Our
claim is, ultimately, that the results here are theorems of ZF.) In LωCK
2
[G, H]
M is a set, so the forcing relation p |⊢ “σ |= φ” for statements about M is
definable, ∆1 even. So take the ground model U to be LωCK
1
[G] or LωCK
2
[G],
whichever you feel more comfortable with.
Suppose for a contradiction that Resolvability were to hold inM: σ |= “f is a
resolution”. Let p ∈ fH force such: p |⊢ “σ |= f is a resolution”. Let supp(f) be
{ n | Hn occurs in the definition of f}. f mentions only finitely many paramters,
each of which is ultimately evaluated in LωCK
1
[G ∪ Hfin] for some finite Hfin ⊆
H. Hence supp(f) is finite, and without loss of generality supp(f) ∪ supp(σ) ⊆
supp(p).
Not only doesM satisfy the Axiom of Foundation, it is even well-founded in
the sense of U[H]; that is, the relation (σ, x) < (τ, y) if (σ ≥ τ ∧σ |= “x ∈ y”) is
well-founded in U[H]. It would be shown inductively on γ that eachMγ has this
property in U[H], hence Mbig too as the union of the Mγ ’s, and finally M as a
submodel of Mbig. Therefore, not only do we have that σ |= “dom(f) is a well-
founded linear order”, but also { α | σ |= “α ∈ dom(f)”} (a collection in U[H]
of Kripke sets) is also a well-founded linear order (with the order relation being
that induced byM). We will refer to this set as extσ(dom f), the externalization
of the domain of f as σ.
So let q ≤ p, q ∈ fH , α, and Hi be such that
q |⊢ “[α is the least member of extσ(dom f) such that for some X ∈ H
σ |= (
∧
n∈supp(p) B(Hn) 6= B(X) ∧ B(X) ∈ f(α))]
∧ [σ |= (
∧
n∈supp(p) B(Hn) 6= B(Hi) ∧ B(Hi) ∈ f(α))]”.
Without loss of generality supp(α) ∪{i} ⊆ supp(q). Consider j 6∈ supp(q).
Let ρj be the permutation of ω which interchanges i and j. ρj can be ex-
tended to a permutation of terms in the forcing language which interchanges
all occurrences of Hi with Hj . This permutation we denote also as ρj . Such a
permutation on terms induces a permutation on sentences (by merely permut-
ing the parameters), and this permutation is truth-preserving (for the language
describing U[H], i.e. without fH):
r |⊢ φ ↔ r ◦ ρj |⊢ ρj(φ).
(For a development of focing and symmetric models, see [5] for instance.) The
sentence forced by q above is in this restricted language, hence
q ◦ρj |⊢ “[ρj(α) is the least member of extσ(dom f) such that
for some X ∈ H σ |= (
∧
n∈supp(p) B(Hn) 6= B(X) ∧ B(X) ∈ f(ρj(α)))]
∧ [σ |= (
∧
n∈supp(p) B(Hn) 6= B(Hj) ∧ B(Hj) ∈ f(ρj(α))]”.
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(Of course we are using the fact that ρj(f) = f .)
Let r ≤ q, q◦ρj. Since r forces that both α and ρj(α) are the leastM-ordinals
with a certain property, r |⊢ α = ρj(α). Hence r |⊢ “B(Hi), B(Hj) ∈ f(α)”.
Let J ⊆ ω\ supp(q), |J| = n finite. Let q ◦ρJ be { q ◦ρj | j ∈ J } and rJ be
inf(q ◦ρJ ∪ {q}). Then rJ |⊢ “B(Hi) ∈ f(α) ∧
∧
j∈J B(Hj) ∈ f(α)”. The set
Rn = { rJ | J ⊆ ω\ supp(q), |J| = n } is definable and pre-dense in the forcing
partial order, so fH∩ Rn 6= ∅. This means that f(α) contains at least n+1-many
distinct Kripke sets of the form B(Hj). Since this holds for all n, f(α) contains
infinitely many such Kripke sets. This, though, is a contradiction. According
to the definition of a resolution, σ |= “f(α) is a set”, and each Kripke set in M
is in LωCK
1
[G ∪ Hfin] for some finite Hfin.
4.4 IKP + V=L + ¬Π2-Reflection
This construction is weaker than the others in that the model produced will
not satisfy ¬Π2-Reflection, but merely will not satisfy Π2-Reflection. In fact
it will be a model of ¬¬Π2-Reflection. This suffices to show that IKP + V=L
does not prove Π2-Reflection, but it is still open whether IKP + V=L proves
¬¬Π2-Reflection.
The partial order of this model will be ω-many copies of 2<ω next to each
other, with two consecutive bottom elements. That is, there is a first node ⊥⊥,
followed by another node ⊥, itself followed by ω-many incompatible nodes ⊥n,
each of which is the bottom node of a copy of 2<ω. We will really be working
with the subtree above ⊥; the role of bottom is merely that ⊥ |= “1⊥⊥ = 1”,
i.e. ⊥ |= “1 ∈ Pˆ”. Let Pˆn be the nth subtree, internally: [σ |= y ∈ Pˆn] ↔
[∃τ compatible with ⊥n σ |= y = 1τ ]; notice that for σ incompatible with ⊥n,
σ |= Pˆn = {1}. (By way of notation, let the numbering of these trees start with
1 instead of 0, because 0 as a subscript is already in use, to indicate including
0 as a member.)
We need the ω-sequence < Pˆn | n ≥ 1 > in the model. To this end, let αn
be Pˆn ∪n+ 1, where, as before, n+ 1 is the internalization of n+1. Notice that
αn is an ordinal, and Lαn = Pˆn ∪ Ln+1 (using lemma 4.1.1 here). Let α be Pˆ
∪ ω ∪ {Tn0 | n ≥ 1} ∪ {αn | n ≥ 1}. So
Lα = Pˆ ∪ Lω ∪
⋃
{def(Tn0) | n ≥ 1} ∪
⋃
{def(Pˆn ∪ Ln+1) | n ≥ 1}.
Over Lα let φ(x, y) iff
0 6= x ∈ ω ∧ 0 6= y ⊆ 1
∧ ∃z(x, y ∈ z)
∧ ∀z(x+ 1 ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z → y = 1).
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We claim that ∀x ⊥ |= “∀y φ(x, y) ↔ y ∈ Pˆx”. To see this, go through the
members of Lα. There is no z in Pˆ with a non-0 member. In Lω the only
possible y (i.e. the only non-0 subset of 1) is 1 itself, and indeed for all x ≥
1 φ(x, 1); since ⊥ |= 1 ∈ Pˆx, this is fine. The only members of ω also in Pˆn0
are 0 and 1, so if z ∈ def(Pˆn0) has a legal x as a member then x = 1. In fact
this is subsumed by the final case: the common members of ω and (Pˆn ∪ Ln+1)
are 0, 1, ... , n; the non-0 subsets of 1 are exactly the members of Tn; so the
appropriate < x, y > candidates are < m, y >, y ∈ Pˆn and m≤n. If m<n and
¬σ |= y = 1 then {m+1, y} shows that ¬σ |= φ(m, y). Hence the only time
σ |= φ(x, y) is when σ |= y ∈ Pˆx.
Keeping in mind that Pˆx ∈ Lα, the functional relation “f(n) = Pˆn” (as a
two-place relation ψ(n, Z)) can be defined over Lα as “∀y y ∈ Z ↔ φ(n, y)”.
There is a small integer m such that this function f is actually a member of
Lα+m. (Lα is available as a parameter already in Lα+1, and all else you need
are some ordered pairs.)
Next comes an extension of the notion of a branch to include a branch
through Pˆn. If Q ⊆ Pˆ is closed downwards (i.e. closed under taking supersets),
then by requiring in the definition of a branch that B ⊆ Q and restricting the
γ’s in clause (3) to Q, we get a branch through Q. The proof of lemma 4.1.7
goes through with Q in place of Pˆ . In the case at hand, any branch through
Pˆn, externally at some σ compatible with ⊥n, is a branch through Pˆσ, and
externally at some σ incompatible with ⊥n is just {1}. Let R be any real, and
Bn the corresponding branch through Pˆn.
Let W be a recursive ordering of ω which is not well-founded but which has
no hyperarithmetic infinite descending sequence. For the convenience of the
reader, we review some basic facts about W which will be used.
For every i there is a W-least j ≤W i such that the W-interval [j,i]W has
order-type some α < ωCK1 . To see this, work in LωCK
1
. Define f(0) = 〈i, 0, 0〉,
f(n+1) = the L-least triple 〈j, α, g〉 such that j <W proj0(f(n)) and g is an
order-isomorphism between [j,i]W and the ordinal α. Set jn = proj0(f(n)). f is a
Σ1-definable function on an initial segment of ω. By the admissibility of LωCK
1
,
f ∈ LωCK
1
. If dom f = ω then i = j0 >W j1 >W ... would be a hyperarithmetic
infinite descending sequence, in contrast to the choice of W. Let n = max(dom
f). Then [jn,i]W is isomorphic to some α ∈ ω
CK
1 , but for all j < jn [j,i]W is not
well-founded. Call this jn corresponding to a given i 0i (“0 in the sense of i”).
In the other direction, ∀i ∈ ω, α ∈ ωCK1 ∃jα ∈ ω such that [i, jα)W has
order-type α (except possibly for those i’s belonging to a final segment of W of
order-type some β < ωCK1 ). To see this, for a given i, if this fails, let α be the
least ordinal for which this fails. By the admissibility of LωCK
1
, {jβ | β < α} ∈
LωCK
1
. If this set is a final segment of W, then the end-segment starting at 0i (as
constructed above) is an end-segment of order-type γ = o.t.[0i, i)W + α < ω
CK
1 .
In the other case, there is a j >W jβ for all β < α. In fact, there is a least such
j, or else the function f(0) = j > jβ (for all β simultaneously) arbitrary, f(n+1)
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= the least (in the standard ordering of ω) j such that j <W f(n) and j > jβ
(∀β) would produce a hyperarithmetic infinite descending sequence. This least
such j witnesses that [i,j) has order-type α, in contrast to the choice of α.
Combining these two results, we see that every i is contained in a maximal
interval of order-type an ordinal, and this interval starts at 0i ≤W i and has
order-type ωCK1 (or some β < ω
CK
1 on a final segment). We will call this interval
i’s standard neighborhood, with the notation sn(i). If i1 >W i0 is not in i0’s
standard neighborhood, then ∀j ∈ sn(i0) i1 >W j; we will use the notation
i1 >W sn(i0) in this case and say that i1 is a non-standard distance above i0.
Notice that in this case there is an iˆ such that i1 >W sn(ˆi) and iˆ >W sn(i0). To
see this, notice that { j | sn(i0) <W j <W 0i1 } is non-empty, else sn(i0) would
be a member of LωCK
1
(definable as [0i0 , 0i1)W ) and f(j) = order-type([0i0, j)W )
would then be a total function from sn(i0) onto ω
CK
1 . Let iˆ be any element such
that sn(i0) <W iˆ <W 0i1 .
With these preliminaries behind us, we can now return to the construction
of the model M. Given a final segment of W with least element i, let ξi be
{Bj0 | j ≥W i} ∪ α ∪ {α}. As in section 4.2, iterate definability ω
CK
1 -many
times on top of Lξi , to get Mi. As has already been observed, lemmas 4.2.2 -
4.2.4 did not use any particular facts about the reals used to define the branches,
and so in the following we will freely omit details of the proofs, referring the
reader to the proofs of these previous lemmas.
M will be
⋃
i∈IMi, for some final segment I of W with no least element.
The exact choice of I will be given in lemma 4.4.8, the only place where it’s
used.
Lemma 4.4.1 Mi |= IKP.
proof: As in lemma 4.2.2.
Lemma 4.4.2 Lα ∈ LMi .
proof: αn is definable over Lαn as the set of all ordinals, so αn ∈ Lα and α ⊆
Lα. Since Mi is admissible, γ = { β ∈ Lα | def(Lβ) ⊆ Lα } ∈ Mi. α ⊆ γ, so
Lα ⊆ Lγ . By the definition of γ, Lγ ⊆ Lα.
Corollary 4.4.3 f ∈ Mi.
proof: f ∈ Lα+n, and since Lγ = Lα, Lγ+n = Lα+n.
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Lemma 4.4.4 In Mi, if ⊥ |= “B is a branch through f(j)” then j ≥W i.
proof: Suppose j <W i. Consider Mi at node ⊥j . For any definition φ(x) at
any stage in the construction of Mi, consider the structure which consists of all
of the relevant information: at first this includes the stage α at which φ is being
evaluated, (Mi)α, the formula φ, and φ’s parameters, but these parameters can
themselves be unpacked, until the only parameters left are from Pˆj . This uses
of course that at ⊥j all of the branches included in ξj are {1}. The parameters
are all of the form 1σ. Let τ be any node beyond or incompatible with all such
σ’s. Then τ |= φ(1ρ) for some ρ extending τ iff τ |= φ(1ρ) for every ρ extending
τ of the same length. (The proof of this would use an automorphism of the
model interchanging any two such ρ’s.) So φ could not possibly define a branch
through Pˆj .
Lemma 4.4.5 If k ≤W i then Lξi ∈ L
Mk .
proof: In Mk, let Bfull be { B ∈ Lξk | B is a branch through f(j) for some j
≥W i }. Letting δ be { B0 | B ∈ Bfull } ∪ T, and letting γ be as in lemma
4.4.2, Lξi = Lδ∪γ∪{γ}.
Corollary 4.4.6 If k ≤W i then Mi ⊆ Mk.
proof: As in lemma 4.2.3.
Corollary 4.4.7 Mi |= V=L.
proof: As in lemma 4.2.4.
Lemma 4.4.8 M |= IKP.
proof: As the union of transitive models of IKP (see lemma 4.4.1), M auto-
matically satisfies Empty Set, Infinity, Union, and ∆0-Comprehension. One of
the more difficult axioms to check, surprisingly enough, is Pairing. That is the
point of the penultimate corollary, which also implies Extensionality. Founda-
tion holds because M is well-founded in V.
The only other axiom is ∆0 Bounding. The choice of I will be exactly to
ensure this. The construction is really the same as in [8]; we replicate the main
30
idea here to make this paper self-contained. Notice that for any choice of I any
node other than ⊥ forces IKP, because ⊥i |= M = Mi if i ∈ I, and ⊥i |= M
= “Mi without the branch” which also models IKP, if i 6∈ I. So we need con-
cern ourselves only with functions forced to be total by ⊥. There are countably
many ∆0 definitions (with parameters) which might define a total function on
a set. We’ll handle the nth, φn(x, y), at stage n. Assume inductively we have
maxn a non-standard distance above minn in W (max0 and min0 being arbi-
trary elements of W a non-standard distance apart). By the discussion about W
(just before the lemmas of this section), let m be a non-standard distance above
minn and a non-standard distance below maxn (i.e. sn(minn) < m and sn(m)
< maxn). In Mm either φn defines a total function or it doesn’t. In the former
case, Mm contains a bounding set (by lemma 4.4.1), which is also a bounding
set in any model extending Mm, so let maxn+1 = m (and let minn+1 = minn).
In the latter case, φn is not total in Mm, or, for that matter, in any transitive
submodel thereof (by the absoluteness of ∆0 formulas among transitive models).
So let minn+1 = m (and let maxn+1 = maxn). Let I = {i | ∃n i ≥ maxn}.
Lemma 4.4.9 M |= V=L.
proof: The union of models of V=L is also a model of V=L.
Lemma 4.4.10 M 6|= Π2-Reflection.
proof: The assertion “B is a branch through S” is ∆0, hence absolute in all
transitive sets containing the parameters. So if ⊥ |= “B is a branch through
f(j)” then j ∈ I. Moreover, if j ∈ I, then ⊥ |= “there is a branch through f(j)”.
So ⊥ |= “∀j, Bj ∃i, Bi if Bj is a branch through f(j) then either f(j) = {1} or
(i<W j and Bi is a branch through f(i))”. But this does not reflect to any set,
because each set is a member of some Mi, which is constructible in LωCK
1
, in
which W has no infinite descending sequence.
5 Questions
1. Is there a model of Σ1 DC + IKP + V=L + ¬Resolvability?
2. Is there a model of IKP + V=L + ¬Π2-Reflection?
3. Does IZF prove that admissible sets are unbounded (that is, for each set X
is there a transitive admissible set containing X)? Does IZF prove the existence
of an admissible set with ω? The usual constructions of admissible sets use
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either reflection or the linearity of the ordinals, neither of which is available to
us here.
4. Does IZFRep (that is, IZF with the Bounding Schema substituted by the
Replacement Schema) prove IKP? With some better technology (see question
6) it should be possible to show that IZFRep - Power does not prove IKP. Also,
[3] (with a minor alteration) shows that IZFRep does not prove Π1 Bounding.
But whether IZFRep proves ∆0 Bounding is apparently unknown.
5. As has already been observed, least fixed points and greatest fixed points
are closely connected classically, but not so intuitionistically. How much can
they be separated? Can IKP be strengthened so that even more least fixed
points become definable, without picking up Π Persistence or any greatest fixed
points? Conversely, can Π Persistence by extended to get more greatest fixed
points, without picking up IKP or least fixed points? There are connections
between least and greatest fixed points and their categorical analogues, initial
algebras and final co-algebras of functors, so these matters could be pursued
from this angle; but not so much is known even there, and the connections are
not yet so clear. These considerations suggest a similar yet simpler question,
involving the first order quantifiers: has anyone investigated existential intu-
itionistic logic (with ∃, even ¬∃¬, but not ∀), or universal intuitionistic logic?
6. Are there other natural examples of the difference between IKP and Π
Persistence?
7. Another variant on IKP yet to be mentioned is the weakening of ∆0
Bounding to Σ1 Replacement. It can be shown that classically Σ1 Replacement
does not imply ∆0 Bounding; in fact, it is possible to build a classical model of
full Replacement + ¬∆0 Bounding. It would have been nice to have included
in this paper an adaptation of this model to IL. However, this project brings up
a host of new problems. All of the models presented here which use forcing do
so only in an ambient classical universe to get some particular desired property.
For instance, a failure of Σ1 DC in a classical model is imported to become a
failure of Σ1 DC in the intuitionistic model. In order to get ∆0 Bounding to
fail, the forcing has to be done internally. Unfortunately, intuitionistic forcing
technology is not yet well enough developed to carry such a burden. Certainly
some work has already been done in this area; see [2] for instance. But not
enough has been done yet to provide a robust enough theory to carry through
the construction envisioned here. This should be possible, but would take us
too far beyond the scope of the current paper.
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